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Abstract
Through the use of experimental methods, this study examines the claim that 
strategic news engenders political cynicism. First, it builds upon previous theory 
by conceptualizing and measuring political cynicism at both issue-specific and global 
levels. Second, the contingency of framing effects is a contested but crucial area of 
the framing paradigm and deserves greater attention in strategic framing studies. The 
study therefore examines this in detail by testing a number of individual characteristics 
for their moderating effects. The author found that relative to issue-based coverage, 
strategic news frames increased issue-specific political cynicism, but this effect was 
only evident for those who were less politically engaged and knowledgeable. The 
effects of the strategy frame on more global measures of political cynicism were 
minimal. The findings are discussed in the light of ongoing debates about framing 
effects and the media’s role in democratic engagement.
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On September 2, 2008, the then–United Kingdom Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Alastair Darling, announced that the minimum threshold for stamp duty to be paid on 
house purchases would rise from £125,000 to £175,000. The move was an attempt to 
breathe life into the stagnating property market and enable first-time buyers to afford 
houses. This is how the UK’s main commercial broadcasting channel, ITV News at 
Ten, led its program on this day:
Home hell: will Brown’s handout rescue the property market, and save  
his skin?
The much-heralded plan to shore up the housing market was finally set out 
today with an unexpected change to stamp duty. The Prime Minister said he 
wanted to help people through a difficult situation, but has he done enough to 
make sure he hangs on to his own set of keys to Number 10?
Readers familiar with recent trends in political journalism may recognize this story as 
an example of the strategic framing of news. This is where policy pronouncements 
such as the one above are primarily interpreted by journalists for their contribution 
towards the political prospects of the politicians involved, rather than their impact on 
the housing market (in this case), wider economy, or people’s lives. Such news empha-
sizes the tactics employed by politicians in pursuing policy goals, as well as their 
performance, styles of campaigning, and personal battles in the political arena, whether 
it be in office, opposition, or during elections (de Vreese and Elenbaas 2008). This 
perspective does not deny that party political or electoral considerations sometimes 
motivate politics. The complaint, however, is that political debate is being eroded by 
a journalism that is obsessed with interpreting political actions through a prism of win-
ning and losing and the strategies associated with this.
In this article, I take up the concern that contemporary news’ focus on the strategic 
game of politics is feeding political cynicism (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Patterson 
1993). I examine the “spiral of cynicism” thesis in the UK in the nonelection policy 
arena rather than the more typically studied campaign context. More specifically, the 
effects of strategic news are examined in the context of a debate in 2003 over Britain’s 
potential entry to the European single currency. Previous research has found variables 
such as political sophistication and partisanship to moderate certain framing 
effects (de Vreese 2004; de Vreese and Elenbaas 2008; Valentino et al. 2001), though 
such research has not elicited consistent results. With this in mind, the article develops 
and then tests the proposition that a number of other individual characteristics may 
moderate strategic framing effects. Consequently, the findings of the study open up 
the possibility that we might consider sophistication and “political engagement” more 
generally as important indicators of who is most susceptible to the effects of strategic 
news. Finally, I argue that there is value in conceptualizing and measuring political 
cynicism at two levels: first, towards the politicians involved in a policy debate; and 
second, towards politicians generally. Findings suggest that such a distinction is 
warranted.
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Strategic Frames and Their Effects
It is argued that journalists are increasingly using the strategic frame as their default 
position when covering politics, and election campaigns in particular (Blumler 1997; 
Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Entman 1989). This argument has largely been upheld 
by a series of election content analyses since the early 1990s (e.g., Jamieson 1992; 
Just et al. 1999; Kerbel et al. 2000; Patterson 1993). Even outside of election periods, 
strategic frames have been found to permeate political coverage (e.g., de Vreese et al. 
2001; Lawrence 2000; Morris and Clawson 2005; Skorkjaer Binderkrantz and Green-
Pedersen 2009).
If the increasing reliance of journalists on strategic frames within political coverage 
is generally accepted, then the effects of this type of news come into question: the 
focus of this study. In a pioneering series of experiments carried out during the 1991 
Philadelphia mayoral race and the 1993 healthcare reform debate in the USA, Cappella 
and Jamieson (1997) found that in both election and nonelection contexts, those who 
were exposed to the strategy news were more likely to think in strategic terms and to 
respond with higher levels of political cynicism. Issue frames did not consistently 
depress cynicism, but neither did they elevate it. Cappella and Jamieson describe this 
process as “a spiral of cynicism,” which can originate from the media and result in a 
more cynical public.
Subsequent research has confirmed these findings, though developments to theory 
have been made. Valentino et al. (2001) found that the type of individual concerned 
moderates framing effects on trust in government and intention to vote. They were left 
to conclude that there was only “a spiral of cynicism for some.” In the context of a 
nonelection political issue (EU enlargement), de Vreese (2004) found that exposure to 
strategic news fuelled political cynicism, especially among the politically knowledge-
able. However, when participants completed the same posttest a week later, the effect 
of the strategy frame had been muted. A later study (de Vreese and Elenbaas 2008) 
confirmed this trend, again in the context of EU news. In a separate study, de Vreese 
(2005b) found evidence to reconsider the above findings, though his methods were 
different. Drawing on two wave panel surveys and content analyses of news media in 
Denmark and the Netherlands, he found that political cynicism was contingent on the 
amount of strategy in the news, and was not omnipresent. Similar to Valentino et al. 
(2001), de Vreese (2005b) found that the demobilizing effect of strategy news was 
mostly confined to the less politically sophisticated. In a further development to our 
understanding of the spiral of cynicism theory, de Vreese and Semetko (2002) found 
that strategy reporting during a referendum campaign contributed to an increase in 
political cynicism and negative campaign evaluations. Turnout, however, remained 
high, leading them to argue that voters can be “cynical and engaged.”
Existing research has therefore convincingly demonstrated that exposure to strate-
gically framed coverage of politics results in significantly greater levels of cynicism. 
But there is less consensus as to whether this effect is equal for all citizens and whether 
a full-blown spiral of cynicism is always the end result.
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Coming to Terms with Political Cynicism
Despite its clear importance as a political sentiment, conceptualizing and measuring 
political cynicism has proven problematic, and disagreement exists over how best to 
approach it (see de Vreese and Semetko [2002] for a good discussion). When studying 
the effects of strategic frames, Cappella and Jamieson (1997) convincingly argue for 
a set of measures of political cynicism beyond those found in American national elec-
tion studies, with their focus on political trust, alienation and efficacy. Instead, they 
propose scales of political cynicism that focus on “the manipulativeness of advocates 
(candidates in campaigns and representatives of groups in policy debates), dishonesty, 
winning and getting ahead, looking good, using fear, the absence of real choice, and 
the role of big money” (p. 143). Their measures have been influential enough to be 
subsequently adapted for a number of other studies in this field (e.g., de Vreese 2004; 
de Vreese and Elenbaas 2008; de Vreese and Semetko 2002). Nevertheless, it is 
important to point out that Cappella and Jamieson’s measures of cynicism are primar-
ily aimed towards the particular actors that subjects encountered in the experimental 
studies. This is fine, and their findings still stand as a breakthrough in this field, but 
these measures of cynicism do not tell us much about the impact of frames on attitudes 
towards politicians and the workings of government generally (also see Valentino 
et al. 2001). These broader measures are important indicators of the health of a 
democracy (Pattie et al. 2004), and so understanding how they may be affected by 
exposure to news with a strategic slant warrants attention. It is therefore proposed that 
making a distinction between different dimensions of political cynicism can enhance 
the theoretical breadth of the spiral of cynicism thesis.
Making such a distinction is not an original pursuit in political science. Miller 
(1974), for example, interprets cynicism as an absence of trust at the level of both 
institutions of government and the regime as a whole, whereas others (e.g., Citrin 
1974) treat it as negativism and disapproval at the level of candidates and incumbent 
political leaders. Erber and Lau (1990) offer such a distinction based on cynicism 
towards persons on one hand and issues and institutions on the other. Their distinction 
holds some value when considering the impact of strategic news, and so it will be 
pursued in this study but adapted to suit the methodological needs of framing studies. 
Two dimensions of political cynicism are used presently. The first (called issue-
specific political cynicism) closely follows Cappella and Jamieson’s (1997), as it is set 
within the confines of the experimental media stimulus material (such as a public 
policy debate or election campaign). Its focus is on the character and motivations of 
the politicians who appear in the stimulus material, as well as one’s confidence in the 
process of the specific policy debate. The second dimension of political cynicism 
(called global political cynicism) assesses the character and motivations of politicians, 
alongside satisfaction with the political system, beyond the confines of the media stim-
ulus material. It is plausible to hypothesize that because it is detached from the specif-
ics of the stimulus material, and operates at a general level, global cynicism will be 
more stable and resistant to short-term change than issue-specific cynicism. For 
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example, a viewer could watch a strategically framed account of a political event of 
the day and feel cynical towards those politicians who were portrayed in a cynical, 
strategic light. However, their confidence in government, and opinion of politicians in 
general may remain robust, as these views have been constructed over a number of 
years and are more deeply felt than those towards specific politicians. Accordingly, 
I offer two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Exposure to news framed in terms of strategy will produce a 
higher level of issue-specific political cynicism relative to exposure to issue-
based news.
Hypothesis 2: The effects of news framed in terms of strategy will be weaker on 
global political cynicism than issue-specific political cynicism.
Individual Characteristics and Framing Effects
Within media effects research, a strong body of research has emphasized the impor-
tance of individual characteristics as moderators of media impact (e.g., Ansolabehere 
and Iyengar 1995; Iyengar 1991; Zaller 1992). In turn, it has become customary for 
studies of strategic framing effects to explore certain characteristics as moderators. 
However, this research has elicited conflicting and somewhat ambiguous results. 
Valentino et al. (2001), for example, found that nonpartisans and those with lower 
levels of education (which they called political sophistication) were significantly 
demobilized by strategy-based coverage. Similarly, de Vreese (2005b) found that 
strategic news had its largest demobilizing effect on the less politically interested, 
but only in one out of the two cases under investigation. However, other studies 
(de Vreese and Elenbaas 2008; Rhee 1997) demonstrated the opposite: Those 
with higher levels of political sophistication were more susceptible to strategic 
framing effects.
This inconsistency is curious, and so a brief exploration of why certain characteris-
tics might moderate framing effects is warranted. Most scholars are in agreement that 
knowledgeable citizens appear to be more sophisticated in their information process-
ing. The theory of framing effects developed by Cappella and Jamieson (1997), for 
example—paralleling arguments made by McGuire (1968) regarding persuasion and 
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) regarding central route attitude change—is that political 
sophisticates have more organized, integrated, and utilitarian knowledge structures. 
“They are not simply more intense consumers of news but rather deeper processors of 
it. They bring different motivations to news consumption and carry away knowledge 
that is more readily integrated into an already elaborated knowledge store” (Cappella 
and Jamieson 1997: 199). But there appears to be less agreement as to whether greater 
knowledge and sophistication makes someone more or less prone to framing effects. 
Valentino et al. (2001: 350) argue that the least sophisticated are more likely to accept 
the frame offered to them by the news. This is because political sophisticates have 
large storehouses of existing information that provides the context (in terms of 
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knowledge about political issues, parties, or candidates) in which any news story is 
processed. This storehouse gives the individual greater means by which to negoti-
ate or reject the message in the story, thus reducing its impact. In contrast, because 
the less sophisticated individual lacks such a store of information, he or she is less 
able to resist the frame given in a news story. Zaller’s (1992) influential research 
on receptiveness (or resistance) to mass-mediated political information supports 
such a theory, with the most sophisticated respondents least likely to change their 
opinions in the face of persuasive messages. But other framing literature rejects 
such a model of effects. This research argues that a consideration highlighted by a 
frame cannot impinge on an attitude unless it is available in memory, which, by 
definition, requires knowledge (Chong and Druckman 2007). Therefore, precisely 
because political sophisticates have a large storehouse of contextual information, 
the frames found in news stories become more familiar and, hence, are more acces-
sible when making an evaluation (Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman and Nelson 
2003; Nelson et al. 1997).
Which theory will explain the effects of strategic frames most satisfactorily? 
Because the strategic frame is a generic frame (see de Vreese 2005a), which is abun-
dant in political coverage, all types of citizens (both those with high and low political 
knowledge) should be aware of it. At the core of strategic frames lies a cynical under-
tone that questions the sincerity of politicians’ motivations. It is hard to imagine any 
citizens nowadays are unfamiliar with the concept of cynicism regarding politics, thus 
putting into question whether an individual’s storehouse of information will be a sig-
nificant variable at all. Given the inconsistency of findings and contested nature of 
research on political knowledge as a moderator of framing effects, I pose a research 
question:
Research Question 1: How, if at all, does political knowledge moderate the 
effects of strategic frames on political cynicism (issue-specific and global)?1
Looking beyond knowledge/sophistication, there is little research examining the 
moderating role of political engagement more generally. Yet there are reasons to 
think it could play an important role. First, it should not be assumed that more politi-
cally knowledgeable individuals are necessarily more politically engaged. In the UK 
and USA, for example, there is a growing trend towards educated and politically 
knowledgeable people choosing to disengage from politics, or channel their partici-
pation towards nontraditional forms of action (Bennett 2004; Delli Carpini 2000; 
Pattie et al. 2004).
Second, engagement with the political system brings certain motivations to the 
processing of news frames, which political knowledge alone does not bring. Framing 
effects research has for years emphasized the importance of motivation, generally 
finding that the most motivated individuals can reject frames more easily than the less 
motivated (Druckman 2004; Fazio 1995; Ford and Kruglanski 1995). Personal moti-
vation promotes attention to the appropriateness of a consideration and greater focus 
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on the substantive merits of a frame in judging its persuasiveness. Therefore, anything 
that promotes motivation will also increase the probability that one will pursue a 
central or systematic route to evaluating information (Chong and Druckman 2007). In 
our case, motivation can come from political engagement, which gives the individual 
reason to process a strategic frame centrally. For instance, exposure to strategic news 
may challenge his or her belief that political participation matters or, for party identi-
fiers, it may depict a favored politician in cynical colors. In both of these circum-
stances, the engaged individual is likely to be motivated to resist the frame offered in 
the news, even if she or he may lack knowledge and sophistication. In contrast, the 
disengaged individual, lacking the same motivation, is more likely to use uncritically 
the considerations that have been made accessible through exposure to the frame. This 
proposition is tested in the current study, where I test four further variables for their 
moderating role in strategic framing effects.
The UK’s Electoral Commission (2007) divide political engagement into three cat-
egories: knowledge and interest, participation and action, and efficacy and satisfaction 
with the political system. There are far too many variables within these categories to 
be included in a study of this nature, so I take some of the most commonly cited from 
each category as indicators of political engagement. These are interest in politics, par-
tisanship and intention to vote in the next general election2 (as indicators of participa-
tion and action), and political efficacy. If the theory of motivation affecting the 
processing of news frames holds true, then one would expect all of these features of 
political engagement to moderate the impact of strategy frames.
Hypothesis 3: Those individuals with high levels of political engagement (indi-
cated through interest, partisanship, voting likelihood, political efficacy) will 
be more resistant to strategic frames than the less engaged.
Research Design
The “euro debate” of May to June 2003 was chosen as the topic for this experimental 
study. This refers to the lead-up and reaction to the British government’s decision not 
to hold a referendum on joining the European single currency for the time being. The 
choice of the single currency issue allows us to explore the effects of strategically 
framed news outside of the campaign context, though it perhaps cannot be considered 
a “routine” policy debate. Norris (2000) points out that coverage of European affairs 
is different from that of domestic politics. For domestic issues, the public has multiple 
sources of information on which to base their opinions, such as personal experiences 
of public services, the health of the economy, and so on. Consequently, they are able 
to discount some of the information they receive from the media. This is not the case 
for the EU, as it often takes place at an abstract and complex level, which ordinary 
people do not always see. With an issue like the euro, this makes the British public 
more like “observers” than “participants” (Gavin 2007) and can amplify the impor-
tance of the media in shaping British public opinion. Nevertheless, the impact of these 
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circumstances is more likely to concern the level of cynicism than the underlying 
dynamics that lie at the core of the study, and therefore the euro debate still represents 
an interesting and important case study to apply the strategy frame to in a nonelection 
context.
To test the effects of strategic versus issue-based news coverage, an experimental 
method was employed. Despite claims of limited external validity, experiments remain 
the best method when disentangling cause and effect in media research (Brown and 
Melamed 1990; Kinder and Palfrey 1993) and have been the method of choice for 
much research into strategic framing effects. Two experimental conditions were made, 
one strategy and one issue.3 The experiments took the form of a pretest, then exposure 
to media material, then a posttest. The pretest measured for basic demographic data 
about the participants, as well as their media habits, political views, and aspects of 
political engagement. Depending on the random assignment to one of two experimen-
tal conditions, respondents were then exposed to either a strategy or issue framed 
account of the 2003 euro debate. After this, they completed a posttest questionnaire, 
including questions concerning political cynicism.
The media content consisted of a montage of TV news clips and newspaper/online 
articles that were organized in order to be coherent to the outsider. The material cov-
ered the lead-up and reaction to then–Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown’s 
announcement of the decision on euro entry (on June 9, 2003). There were about 
twenty minutes of media material in each treatment: ten minutes of newspaper/online 
articles and ten minutes of television news clips (see Appendix A for an overview of 
experimental content). Both strategy and issue treatments contained news articles and 
TV clips from the same sources. The use of both print and TV news material means 
that we cannot be sure whether the medium has an influence on the effect of the stimu-
lus material, but this is not the main focus of the study.
There was some common content between both of the treatments, so both of them 
introduced the background of the single currency and what the results of the govern-
ment’s assessment on euro entry were. The differences between the treatments came 
in how they framed the “story” of the euro debate. The issue treatment framed it 
around the consequences of joining (or not) for the British economy, business, and 
ordinary people. The strategy material also contained some of this information, in 
order to give some context to the euro debate. However, consistent with how it has 
been conceptualized in the literature (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Valentino et al. 
2001), the strategy treatment framed the euro debate as a story about the performance, 
style, and perceptions of the main parties/politicians during the debate, with an under-
lying suggestion that their motivations may be for personal gain. All five elements of 
Jamieson’s (1992) definition of the strategy frame were included in this content,4 
though to varying extents. For example, the strategy frame employed did have mention 
of public opinion polls, but it was not a “heavy weighting” as Cappella and Jamieson 
(1997) define. Varying all elements of strategic news does leave some uncertainty 
about which of them has caused cynicism, but conclusions can still be made based on 
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their cumulative effect. As a typical news story might include all elements of the 
strategy frame, this adds to the realism of the research design.
This study represents a different design to some other framing studies, as instead of 
having otherwise identical news stories that are manipulated to give a strategy or issue 
frame, it used some different media content altogether in the two treatments. This 
therefore represents a relatively liberal test of the strategy frame, as there is less con-
trol over the stimulus content. Such a design has pros and cons: First, it means that the 
strategy impact should be greater compared to other such studies, because there is 
more overall strategy content. This may place greater limits on external validity than 
some experiments do, as it may give some respondents a heavier dose of strategy 
frames than they would normally experience when consuming the news. Using differ-
ent media content for the two treatments also means that there are potentially other 
variations in the material other than the strategy frame that may cause an effect. For 
example, the strategy treatment contains roughly one minute more TV news material 
and one thousand more words of newspaper material than the issue frame. The deci-
sion not to change the original news material meant that it would be difficult to achieve 
an exact match of news material in terms of length. Still, care was taken to ensure the 
material in both experimental conditions was equivalent in terms of length and source. 
Qualitative (n = 10) and quantitative (n = 32) manipulation checks were conducted in 
the pilot study with undergraduate students at the author’s university.5 These proved 
the manipulation was successful, giving us confidence that there were no extraneous 
variables that explain political cynicism other than the frame itself.
The reason this design was employed was due to the advantage of mundane realism 
(Aronson et al. 1990), as real TV news clips with familiar newsreaders were used, as 
well as real newspaper articles. As McNair (2006) argues, credibility of the source is 
vitally important in these sorts of studies. Even where experimental studies have 
designed their own newspaper article, authenticity can be lost because the reader 
knows it is not from a real newspaper. Our design does not encounter this problem and 
is consistent with other successful experimental designs in this field (Cappella and 
Jamieson 1997; Iyengar 1991; McLeod and Detenber 1999; Nelson et al. 1997).
In summary, the desire to create the most realistic experience of the news can mean 
sacrificing some control over other parts of the experiment. All experiments must 
always carry this sort of compromise (Aronson et al. 1990), and openly acknowledg-
ing some of the limitations the chosen design entails provides the context within which 
the results of the experiment can be discussed.
Interactive Design
In contrast to previous experimental designs, this study employed the use of interactive 
online technology. This brings with it a number of advantages and disadvantages. On 
the plus side, rather than persuading participants into a laboratory to complete the 
experiments, by hosting them on an interactive CD, participants were able to take them 
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home and do them in their own time.6 This can help overcome one of the problems of 
artificiality that experiments can encounter. On the other hand, by allowing the exper-
iment to be done in the comfort of one’s own home, attention levels and response rate 
can become an issue. The ability of the user to skim through the media content was 
limited by a function that prevented them from moving to the next screen until either 
the TV news clip had finished playing or they had scrolled to the bottom of a newspa-
per article. This brought back some of the control of media exposure from the respon-
dent to the researcher. The potential for participants to be not fully concentrating on the 
experimental material still remained, but it is equally likely for people to consume the 
material more attentively than they would in the “real world” (Sanders and Norris 
1998). This is quite unavoidable, but as long as attention levels are spread equally 
amongst samples, it is less of an issue.7 Given that response rates for the two CDs were 
almost identical, we can be confident that attention levels were also consistent.
Sample and Procedures
The experiment was conducted between March 3 and April 3, 2005. The single cur-
rency issue was not salient on the media agenda during this period and had received 
little attention since the 2003 government decision. This means that the subject of the 
stimuli would be familiar to participants, but they would be unlikely to recognize any 
specific news stories. The sample consisted of university students and nonacademic 
university staff. Eight hundred CDs were distributed around campus in lectures and 
classes: four hundred strategy and four hundred issue CDs. Participants were randomly 
given either the strategy or issue CD. All participants were told that completion of the 
thirty-minute CD experiment meant that they were entered into a draw for a prize of 
£50. When all of the results were in, all participants were fully debriefed. In all, 298 
people took part in the experiment, 148 in the strategy condition and 150 in the issue 
condition, giving a response rate of 37 percent for the strategy condition and 37.5 per-
cent for the issue condition. The sample cannot claim representativeness for either the 
local or national population, as 63 percent of the respondents were aged eighteen to 
twenty-four, and 73 percent were students. The sample is more educated than the aver-
age, less ethnically diverse, and more affluent. They are also more likely to have some 
interest in current affairs and politics than nonstudent people of their age. Still, the 
fact that participants are consuming national media in the experiments should mean 
that there is no regional exclusiveness to the study. In other words, in principle we 
would find the same results on students anywhere in the UK. The rest of the sample com-
prised university nonacademic and support staff, who were more typical of the local 
population.
The limitations to the external validity of the study need to be considered when 
making conclusions, but they will not affect the internal validity. To achieve internal 
validity, the two samples (strategy and issue) need to be homogeneous in terms of 
prior demographic and attitudinal variables. This was comfortably the case with the 
study. The two samples were virtually identical in terms of education, age, gender, 
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occupation, and media habits; as well as attitudinal variables like partisanship, internal 
political efficacy, and election voting likelihood (all p-values > .05). As a result of 
their homogeneity, we can confidently attribute any differences in the posttest findings 
to the stimulus material and nothing else.
Measures
Issue-specific political cynicism. Four items were derived from Cappella and Jamieson 
(1997) and de Vreese (2004) and adjusted to apply to the context of the issue debate. 
These were designed to gauge perceptions of participants towards the character of 
politicians when it comes to the euro debate, their motivations, and their confidence in 
the process of the specific policy debate. Participants were asked to state their agree-
ment on a 5-point scale to the following questions: (1) “Politicians on both sides of the 
euro debate are willing to do whatever it takes to look good even if it means deceiving 
the public,” (2) “Politicians are clear and honest in their arguments about the euro” 
(reverse coded), (3) “Politicians are too concerned with public opinion about the 
euro,” and (4) “The debate about the euro is more about personality than the substance 
of the issue.” The items were recoded and averaged to form a scale of issue-specific 
political cynicism ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 representing higher cynicism (M = 3.19, 
SD = 0.73, alpha = .76).
Global political cynicism. Respondents were asked to answer statements regarding 
politicians and the political process without any reference to the euro debate. Four 
questions were developed from Pinkleton and Austin (2002) and answered via a 
4-point scale of agreement: (1) “Politicians are out of touch with life in the real 
world”; (2) “Politicians are interested only in people’s votes, not in their opinions”; 
(3) “It seems like politicians only care about themselves or special interests”; and (d) 
“I’m satisfied with the way that government works in our country” (reverse coded). 
The responses were then recoded and averaged to form a scale of global political 
cynicism ranging from 1 to 4, with 4 representing higher cynicism (M = 2.38, SD = 0.55, 
alpha = .68).
Control variables. A number of variables other than exposure to the strategy frame 
were expected to potentially explain political cynicism. With this in mind, I included 
age, gender, political knowledge, internal political efficacy, political interest, amount 
of weekly news consumption, likelihood of voting, and interest in EU news as control 
variables in a conservative test. Some of these variables were also examined for their 
moderating role in strategic framing effects. Appendix B holds both the descriptive 
statistics of these independent variables and the wording of the specific questions.
Results
The expectation of previous theory, subsequently reflected in hypothesis 1, is that 
news framed in terms of political strategy will generate higher levels of political 
cynicism relative to exposure to issue-based news. However, this study included a 
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distinction between issue-specific and global political cynicism. Table 1 presents the 
findings for issue-specific cynicism. Participants in the strategy condition (M = 3.37, 
SD = 0.73) showed significantly higher levels of issue-specific political cynicism in 
comparison to those in the issue condition (M = 2.98, SD = 0.51), thus supporting 
hypothesis 1.
Research question 1 and hypothesis 3 asked the important question of whether indi-
vidual characteristics moderated the impact of strategy news. To examine moderators 
in addition to the frame’s main effects, whilst controlling for other potential cynicism 
predictors, a hierarchical regression model8 was utilized, with issue-specific cynicism 
as the criterion variable. Table 2 presents the findings of this test.
Model 1 shows that of the demographic controls and predispositions examined, 
political knowledge (β = –.19, p < .05) demonstrated a robust negative relationship 
with issue-specific political cynicism, with voting likelihood (β = –.10, p < .10) show-
ing a marginal negative relationship. This means that those who were less likely to 
participate and know about politics were more cynical ceteris paribus. After these 
predispositions were controlled for in model 2, strategy news exposure accounted for 
an additional 5.1 percent of the variation, F(2,292) = 18.54, p <.001. As expected, 
strategy frame exposure (β = .30, p < .001) yielded a strong positive association with 
political cynicism, confirming the findings of Table 1. Upon introduction of the inter-
action terms in model 3, a further 4.2 percent of variation in issue-specific cynicism is 
explained, F-change(3,289) = 4.17, p <.01. In this model, strategic news exposure 
retains its main significant effect (β = .20, p < .01). However, there are also a number 
of interactions between strategic news exposure and political knowledge (β = –.21, 
p < .05), political interest (β = –.18, p < .05), and internal political efficacy (β = –.16, 
p < .05) that emerged as negative and significant drivers of issue-specific political 
cynicism, with the interactions between strategy news exposure and partisanship 
(β = –.15, p < .10) and voting likelihood (β = –.13, p < .10) displaying moderate nega-
tive relationships with cynicism.
In sum, the regression model for issue-specific cynicism established the main 
effects of strategy news exposure, thereby reconfirming the initial finding from Table 1. 
However, it also revealed that these effects were subject to moderation, with a number 
of variables interacting with strategy news exposure to negatively drive issue-specific 
cynicism. There is a consistent pattern to those mostly affected by the strategy frame; 
they are those people who are less politically engaged and knowledgeable. It appears 
Table 1. Issue-Specific Political Cynicism by Experimental Condition
Issue frame (N = 150)
Strategy frame 
(N = 148) t
Issue-specific political cynicism 2.98 (0.51) 3.37 (0.73) 5.35, p < .001
Data entries are means and standard deviations (in parentheses), with higher values representing greater 
cynicism. Significance tests are two-tailed.
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that these people were far less likely to reject the frame offered to them and so were 
more likely to ascribe cynical motivations towards the politicians in the stories. 
Spearman correlation tests confirmed that those who were more knowledgeable were 
also more likely to be politically engaged, by all the measures used. Political knowl-
edge was positively correlated with political interest (r = .198, p < .05), internal politi-
cal efficacy (r = .224, p < .01), partisanship (r = .205, p < .05), and voting likelihood 
(r = .248, p < .01).9
The findings for issue-specific cynicism are very important because they tell us that 
the choices editors and journalists make in framing news stories affect audience evalu-
ations of the actors involved. However, these results tell us less about the impact of 
strategy news on confidence in politicians and governance writ large, which Table 3 
displays.
To reiterate, global political cynicism represents attitudes towards politicians and 
the workings of democracy beyond the focus of a particular policy debate. For this 
Table 2. Effects on Issue-Specific Political Cynicism by Experimental Condition
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age -.02 (.04) -.02 (.04) -.03 (.04)
Gender (male) .07 (.08) .05 (.07) .15 (.07)
Internal political efficacy -.06 (.06) -.09* (.06) -.09* (.06)
Amount of news consumption .03 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01)
Partisanship (partisan) -.08 (.09) -.10 (.09) -.10 (.09)
Voting likelihood -.10* (.02) -.11* (.02) -.11* (.02)
Political interest -.09 (.05) -.07 (.05) -.07 (.06)
Interest in EU news .03 (.05) .03 (.05) .03 (.05)
Political knowledge -.19** (.04) -.19** (.03) -.19** (.03)
Exposure to strategy frame — .30*** (.07) .20** (.11)
Exposure to Strategy Frame × Political 
Knowledge
— — -.21** (.09)
Exposure to Strategy Frame × Partisanship 
(partisan)
— — -.15* (.10)
Exposure to Strategy Frame × Political 
Interest
— — -.18** (.06)
Exposure to Strategy Frame × Internal 
Political Efficacy
— — -.16** (.08)
Exposure to Strategy Frame × Voting 
Likelihood
— — -.13* (.04)
Adjusted R² .14 .19 .23
Incremental R² (%) — 5.1*** 4.2**
n 298 298 298
Ordinary least squares regression. Data are b-values and standard errors (in parentheses).
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .001.
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reason, we might expect the effects of the strategic news frame to be smaller compared 
to issue-specific cynicism, though still not inconsequential based on previous research 
(Valentino et al. 2001). Table 3 illustrates that there was no significant difference in 
cynicism between the issue and strategy samples. For the purpose of brevity, the full 
results of hierarchical regression analysis are not given here, but they tell a story of 
moderate but not significant change in global political cynicism as a result of exposure 
to strategy news. When prior attitudinal and demographic variables were controlled 
for, strategy frame exposure only exerted a moderate influence on global political 
cynicism (β = .11, p < .10), with internal political efficacy (β = –.17, p < .05), political 
knowledge (β = –.24, p < .001) and age (β = –.12, p < .05) all more powerful predictors. 
The impact of moderating variables on strategic framing effects was insignificant. 
Overall, broader measures of cynicism appear to be far more resistant to framing 
effects than issue-specific ones.
Discussion
This study was designed to investigate the contingent effects of strategic news cover-
age in the UK in the context of a nonelection policy debate. It built upon previous 
research by examining political cynicism at two levels and by examining a greater 
number of moderating variables than tested previously. Whilst the limitations of the 
strength of manipulation, the case study, and the sample mean some caution should 
be exercised over the generalizability of the findings, they offer many interesting 
themes that confirm some of our previous understanding, challenge others, and raise 
some important questions for future research.
Findings suggested that those who were exposed to the strategy frame were more 
cynical than their issue counterparts on issue-specific measures, but broader (global) 
levels of cynicism were less affected. These findings are consistent with previous lit-
erature that found effects of the strategy frame on issue-specific political cynicism 
(Cappella and Jamieson 1997; de Vreese 2004; de Vreese and Semetko 2002). As 
might be expected, however, the effect was not uniform for all types of people. 
Whereas comparable framing studies have tested the role of political knowledge 
(e.g., de Vreese 2004; Rhee 1997) and partisanship (e.g., Valentino et al. 2001) as 
moderating variables, this study covered new ground by introducing many more. 
Given the contested nature of political knowledge as a moderator of framing effects, 
research question 1 was posed. The findings with regard to issue-specific cynicism 
Table 3. Global Political Cynicism by Experimental Condition
Issue frame (N = 150) Strategy frame (N = 148) t
Global political cynicism 2.33 (0.44) 2.43 (0.48) 2.18, p = .183
Data entries are means and standard deviations (in parentheses), with higher values representing greater 
cynicism. Significance tests are two-tailed.
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were clear: The least knowledgeable became more cynical as a result of exposure to 
strategic news. As we know, this confirms the findings of some studies (de Vreese 
2005b; Valentino et al. 2001) but contradicts others (de Vreese and Elenbaas 2008; 
Rhee 1997). It is therefore difficult to make wider conclusions about the role of politi-
cal knowledge as a moderator of framing effects. However, in this study the more 
politically knowledgeable were also more likely to be more politically engaged, allow-
ing us to consider them together as part of a broader theory of strategic framing effects. 
Earlier I hypothesized (hypothesis 3) that for the most engaged, strategic news will 
have less impact—and results confirmed this. It therefore appeared that compared to 
engaged citizens, the less engaged were less resistant to the narrative of politics offered 
by the strategy frame and thus expressed significantly more issue-specific cynicism as 
a result of exposure to it. As already suggested, this effect can be explained by their 
low interest in political news, which is related to lower political knowledge; their low 
involvement in political affairs (voting likelihood and efficacy); plus their lack of 
attachment to a party. As a result, they are less motivated to centrally process the news 
story, and they possess fewer competing frames to call upon when asked to express 
their view of politicians. But one of the frames they will possess is the strategic frame 
and its cynical portrayal of politicians. It seems exposure to strategic news activates 
this cynicism in less engaged individuals where exposure to issue-based news does 
not. My findings provide support for Valentino et al.’s (2001) position that strategic 
news might not alienate those invested in politics because they are more likely to 
accept that politicians from both sides must play aspects of the political game to fulfill 
their role as elected representatives. Those with weaker ties to politics, however, appear 
to be far less forgiving when politicians are portrayed as strategically motivated.
To look at the broader significance of these findings regarding moderating vari-
ables, the results allow us to tentatively suggest that alongside political knowledge 
and partisanship, a broader conception of political engagement can moderate the 
effects of strategic news. If this is the case, then we would expect other indicators of 
political engagement not tested in this study to have a similar effect. Future research 
might examine these in order to test such a thesis. Political engagement is not a com-
monly used moderating variable in general framing effects literature, but then I have 
argued that strategic news framing may work slightly differently here. This is because 
the dependent variable is political cynicism, and the news frame depicts politics as a 
strategic game played by power-hungry politicians. Therefore, the likelihood of an 
individual subscribing to the frame can be influenced by variables closely related to 
the dependent variable, in our case broader political engagement. In the context of a 
study about news frames and attributions of responsibility for unemployment for 
example (Iyengar 1991), political engagement is unlikely to be such an important 
moderating variable.
Turning to evaluations of the general motivations of politicians and their belief in 
the system of government (global cynicism), the effect of strategic framing was less 
marked, suggesting that such attitudes were more resistant to short-term change. 
Sections of the sample may have become cynical about politicians regarding a policy 
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debate, but very few were turned off politics altogether. This is an important finding 
because previous research has tended to use either issue-specific (e.g., Cappella and 
Jamieson 1997) or global/generic measures (e.g. Valentino et al. 2001) of cynicism, 
not both, in the same study. Whereas Valentino et al. (2001) found strategy news to 
activate global cynicism in certain individuals, there were no significant relationships 
found in this study. This might be a curious finding considering the similar research 
designs and procedures of Valentino et al. and the current study, but it is in line with 
other European research of recent years which has tended to find more moderate 
effects of strategic news (e.g., de Vreese 2004, 2005b) when compared to American 
studies, thus suggesting that the political settings may make a difference.
Conclusion
The results of this study only partially support any concept of a “spiral of cynicism” 
in the UK, with “a spiral of cynicism for some” (Valentino et al. 2001) being a more 
accurate conclusion. From the findings, we can tentatively suggest Valentino et al.’s 
(2001) theory is expanded beyond knowledge and partisanship, to a more general 
conception of political engagement and knowledge. But given that the moderating role 
of political knowledge continues to elicit contradictory findings, further research is 
required to draw firm conclusions in this respect. What is more, future research should 
not rule out the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between political knowledge 
and/or engagement and susceptibility to strategic framing effects. Here, individuals 
most susceptible to media effects may be those in the moderate category of knowledge 
and/or engagement; who possess enough knowledge to understand, process, and incor-
porate the frame; but lack knowledge to base their political judgments on ideology, 
party identification, or other stable, long-held predispositions. Such a scenario was not 
supported by the present study’s findings, but in the case of knowledge, it has been 
found elsewhere in media effects research (e.g., Valenzuela 2009; Zaller 1992). 
Nevertheless, if we accept that certain individuals are more susceptible to strategic 
framing effects, then it is important for future research to understand exactly how this 
relates to media consumption, as it may be that certain news sources hold more fram-
ing power than others as a result of their audience demographic. The question for 
future content analyses might then be how different media sectors and mediums cover 
strategy versus issues, something that has tended to be overlooked in studies that 
(commendably) often choose comparative and longitudinal breadth over depth.
The finding that global cynicism was, at best, only moderately affected by strategy 
news suggests that, in the UK at least, this type of news may not have the same deleteri-
ous consequences for the body politic that others suggest. However, there remain some 
strong reasons why we should not be too sanguine about the findings and their conse-
quences for democratic engagement. The first is that this single-exposure experimental 
study cannot rule out the possibility that consistent doses of strategic news can result in 
a cumulative effect on global political cynicism, akin to the cultivation or “sleeper 
effect” theories of media effects (see Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2006; Zaller 1992, 
2002). Indeed, as a result of their comprehensive review of framing, priming, and 
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agenda–setting effects literature, plus their own data, Cappella and Jamieson (1997) 
apply the cultivation theory to the effects of strategy frames. In their model, as a result 
of strategy news, audiences will learn about candidates’ strategic activities and evaluate 
politicians in more cynical ways (issue-specific cynicism). Over a sustained period, as 
patterns of association are activated and reactivated, and strategic narratives reinforced, 
cynicism towards candidates will be cultivated to become cynicism towards politicians 
and campaigns more widely (global cynicism), and perhaps policy debates and gover-
nance as well. Ultimately this cynicism can result in public disengagement from the 
political process. Evidence to substantiate their claims from within the field of framing 
studies is, however, mixed. Valentino et al.’s (2001) experiment found that nonparti-
sans and nongraduates were somewhat less likely to say that they intended to vote as a 
result of exposure to the strategy frame, but otherwise the rest of their sample were no 
different to those exposed to the issue frame. Other studies have found that although 
frequent and repeated exposure to strategic news increased respondents’ levels of polit-
ical cynicism, turnout in a national referendum remained high and unrelated to the level 
of cynicism (de Vreese and Semetko 2002; Elenbaas and de Vreese 2008).
Separate from news framing studies, much political science literature in the USA 
and UK has explored the link between political cynicism and voting behavior 
(e.g., Almond and Verba 1963; Bartle 2002; Pattie et al. 2004; Rosenstone and Hansen 
1993). In most cases, global measures of political attitudes are important because they 
have, to varying degrees, proved useful in explaining turnout in elections. Even when 
only weak relationships between these attitudes and participation have been found, 
most are unwilling to dismiss the importance of changes in them for the health and 
welfare of democracy (Craig 1993; Weatherford 1987).
A further reason why the findings should not be dismissed is the steady accumula-
tion of content analysis data from a number of election and nonelection settings, which 
continue to demonstrate the saturation of contemporary news with strategic frames. 
This is important when we consider the mix of strategic and substantive news frames 
that the average citizen receives and provides some credibility to the sort of cultivation 
effect that Cappella and Jamieson (1997) propose.
If we therefore accept that strategic news is a problem, then perhaps the solution is 
for news organizations to offer more substantive news. But how realistic is such an 
outcome, given the current context in which many political journalists find themselves? 
Like many of their colleagues from other countries, UK news organizations are work-
ing in an increasingly commercial climate. Some of the most significant consequences 
of this are as a result of cost-cutting and the increasing pressure on journalists to pro-
duce more copy with the same or even less resources than in the past (Lewis et al. 
2008). Strategic news appeals here because it is quick, cheap, and provides an easy way 
for journalists to put a new twist on the day’s news compared to researching issues of 
substance (Fallows 1996; Kuhn 2003; Patterson 1993). In an increasingly competitive 
environment, news values become more imperative. Furthermore, in the eyes of 
journalists, strategic news has more intrinsic news value than substantive news (see de 
Vreese 2005a), as the former offers human interest, conflict, shared narratives 
(e.g., good vs. evil), and controversy (McManus 1994; Price and Tewksbury 1997).
92  International Journal of Press/Politics 16(1)
A focus on strategic news is also an outcome of the “journalistic fightback” to 
perceived loss of autonomy due to ever more media savvy politicians and their PR 
consultants (Blumler 1997). Recent survey-based evidence gives little reason to 
believe that the relationship between journalists, politicians, and their media handlers 
is likely to improve any time soon (Brants et al. 2009).
A final reason that strategic news it unlikely to abate is that its undercurrent of 
cynicism with regards to politicians suits a narrative of politics that the electorate is 
increasingly in tune with. The evidence from this study, alongside other evidence in 
this field, shows how strategic news frames can activate and encourage political cyni-
cism. But there can still be some credence to the news media’s claim that they are 
merely reflecting a real public cynicism with politics in their coverage. Recent politi-
cal scandals experienced in the UK over MP’s expenses and political lobbying only 
serves to provide more reasons for journalists to suggest that politicians are motivated 
by personal gain.
In many ways, therefore, the conditions in which strategic news becomes most 
appealing to journalists are in the ascendancy. The degree of concern this ought to 
elicit might be dependent on the long-term impact of consistent exposure to strategic 
news and its potential link to democratic engagement. But as yet, this crucial question 
remains unresolved, and it will continue to provide a challenge for future research.
Appendix A
Summary of Experiment CD Content
Summary of issue CD media content Summary of strategy CD media content
Item 1
BBC Ten o’clock News, May 13, 2003, 1.48 min.
The Five Tests: The BBC’s economics editor, 
Evan Davis, explains the five economic tests 
for Euro entry and how likely they are to 
be passed on June 9.
Item 1
BBC Ten o’clock News, May 13, 2003, 1.48 min.
The Five Tests: The BBC’s economics editor, 
Evan Davis, explains the five economic tests 
for Euro entry and how likely they are to be 
passed on June 9.
Item 2
The Daily Telegraph, May 16, 2003, p. 13, 1,546 
words.
“The Euro: What Really Matters to Britain.” 
By Philip Johnston.
This article firstly explains the five tests, then 
outlines the arguments for and against 
Britain entering the Euro. It considers 
the implications of entering the Euro 
for mortgages, pensions, jobs, prices in 
the shops, taxes, and finally for British 
sovereignty.
Item 2
Five News at 7pm, May 13, 2003, 1.01 min.
The Five Tests: Five News’s political editor, Andy 
Bell, highlights the ambiguity of the five tests, 
and suggests that a sixth test will be just 
as important to the government: whether 
they can win a referendum on the Euro. 
He therefore highlights the importance of 
political strategy for the outcome of the 
assessment on Britain’s membership of the 
single currency. 
(continued)
Jackson 93
Summary of issue CD media content Summary of strategy CD media content
Item 3
Five News at 7pm, June 9, 2003, 3.51 min.
Five News reporters John Gilbert and Mark 
Jordan take sides on the Euro debate, 
each taking turns to present their case. 
The case for stresses the ease of currency 
transactions in the Eurozone, for both 
businesses and tourists. He also argues that 
trade and investment would be greater 
if Britain entered the Euro. Finally, he 
points out that competition from within 
the Eurozone would drive down prices 
in British shops. The case against joining 
firstly points out British public opinion 
on the issue: the majority being against 
joining. The inflexibility of the single interest 
rate is then attacked, as it could have 
pernicious effects for British mortgages. 
British sovereignty is at stake, he argues, 
as our economic decisions are taken away 
from us and given to Frankfurt. He finishes 
by comparing British unemployment and 
trade levels with France and Germany, 
arguing that we are better off staying out of 
the Euro.
Item 3
The Sunday Telegraph, May 11, 2003, p. 2, 814 
words.
“Cabinet Splits as Minister Attacks Brown 
on Euro Delay; PM ‘Authorises’ Pro-Euro 
Ministers to Speak Out against Intransigent 
Chancellor.”
By Colin Brown and Francis Elliot.
A pro-Euro Cabinet minister, Helen Liddell, 
urges the chancellor to consider a sixth 
test of what the consequences would be of 
staying out of the Euro. She also reiterates 
the need for the decision to be made by the 
Cabinet and not the chancellor alone. These 
comments are interpreted by the journalist 
as being part of the prime minister’s strategy 
to take control of the Euro decision from 
Gordon Brown. We are then told of the 
Cabinet “row” over the wording of the 
statement on the five tests: Tony Blair wants 
a positive spin on a “no” announcement, as 
opposed to the more Eurosceptic Brown.
Item 4
BBC Ten o’clock News, May 15, 2003, 1.47 min.
The BBC’s Rory Cellan-Jones analyses the 
views of the car industry on the Euro 
debate.
The boss of General Motors, Richard 
Wagner, says that membership of the 
Euro was not the deciding factor when 
deciding where to invest; instead, it was 
the overall health of the economy. Other 
car companies, such as Ford, are urging 
the government to enter the Euro sooner 
rather than later, because currency 
uncertainty is not good for long-term 
planning.
Item 4
The Independent, May 16, 2003, p. 1, 429 
words.
“Blair’s Cabinet Coup against Brown Clears 
Path for an Early Euro Poll.” By Andrew Grice.
Despite it being widely assumed that the 
chancellor will give a “not yet” verdict on the 
five tests, the fact that there will be a Cabinet 
discussion over the decision is interpreted 
as a tactical victory for Tony Blair over his 
“rival,” Gordon Brown. The influence of the 
largely pro-Euro Cabinet is said to mean 
that the chance of a referendum in the next 
Parliament will not be ruled out. Allies of the 
chancellor insisted that the prospects of a 
referendum had not changed, and dismissed 
the idea that he had lost control of the issue 
as “ridiculous.”
(continued)
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Item 5
The Independent, June 10, 2003, p. 1, 268 
words.
“The Euro: The Five Tests Brown’s Verdict.” 
By Andrew Grice.
Written the day after the announcements of 
the five tests decision, this article outlines 
Gordon Brown’s verdict. Despite significant 
progress over the last couple of years, the 
first test of convergence is still failed. The 
test for financial services is passed, with the 
chancellor stating that EMU entry would 
enhance the already strong position of the 
City. The test of flexibility is failed, “We 
cannot be confident that UK flexibility, 
while improved, is sufficient” according to 
the chancellor. The final two tests on the 
impact of the Euro for growth, stability and 
jobs; and investment, were both undecided. 
If convergence is achieved, then the last 
two tests will be passed.
Item 5
ITV News at Ten, May 18, 2003, 1.31 min.
ITV News’s political correspondent, Libby 
Wiener, summarizes the “Euro row” that has 
been raging in the build up to the five tests 
announcement. Gordon Brown’s statement 
that “economics not dogma” will be the 
deciding factor in his analysis is interpreted 
to mean “I’m in charge” of the Euro decision. 
Brown and Blair then released a statement 
yesterday in an attempt to dampen 
speculation that there was a rift between 
the two. Liberal Democrat economic 
spokesman, Matthew Taylor, criticizes the way 
the Euro decision is being conducted by the 
government.
Item 6
BBC Ten o’clock News, June 9, 2003, 1.47 min.
The View from Europe. The BBC’s Stephen 
Sackur reports from Belgium, on the day 
that Britain said “not yet” to the Euro. He 
looks at how it has impacted ordinary 
lives, and concludes that it has become 
an “unremarkable fact of European life”. 
Voxpops with Belgian people show how 
the Euro works on the street level: it is said 
to make traveling much easier, but prices 
have gone up since its introduction.
Item 6
Daily Telegraph, May 22, 2003, p. 8, 531 words.
“Mandelson Attacked for Fuelling Euro Feud.” 
By George Jones.
Both the chancellor and the PM rounded 
on Peter Mandelson after he claimed that 
Brown had “outmaneuvered” Blair over the 
Euro decision. These comments were also 
picked up by the Opposition leader, Iain 
Duncan Smith, who claimed the Cabinet 
were divided “from top to bottom” on the 
Euro.
Item 7
BBC News Online, June 9, 2003, 731 words.
“Q&A: What does the euro decision mean 
for you? Chancellor Gordon Brown has 
decided that Britain is not yet ready to 
adopt the euro.
What does this mean for you? What are 
the financial and economic implications? 
And will the endless media speculation 
now come to an end? BBC News Online 
explains.” This article answers the following
Item 7
BBC News Online, June 9, 2003, 860 words.
“UK ‘Not Yet Ready for the Euro.’”
This article details the announcement of the 
five tests, on June 9, 2003, with Gordon 
Brown saying “not yet” to the Euro. The 
chancellor outlined the potential benefits to 
Britain of entering the Euro, but he warned 
that joining at the wrong time could see 
unemployment rise, see cuts in public service 
spending and stall economic growth. He said
(continued)
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questions in a Q&A format: What does 
this mean for the pound in my pocket? 
Why did Mr. Brown say no to the Euro? Is 
the chancellor’s decision popular? So what 
happens next?
there was a need for further reforms of the 
UK housing market to tackle instability. And 
he said the government would also review its 
inflation targets as part of efforts to meet the 
test on convergence between the UK economy 
and the Eurozone. The Tories denounced the 
announcement as “an exercise in deceit,” and 
reiterated the splits in government over the 
issue. According to BBC online correspondent 
Nick Assinder, “It was abundantly clear what 
the past two weeks’ of cabinet involvement had 
been all about—saving Tony Blair’s face.”
 Item 8
BBC Ten o’clock News, June 9, 2003, 3.51 min. 
BBC political editor Andrew Marr gives his 
report of the Euro announcement. After 
all of the anticipation of the decision, not 
much happened he says. We are firstly shown 
parts of the chancellor’s speech, before the 
reaction to it by the opposition parties. 
Michael Howard describes Brown and Blair 
as being “united in rivalry,” and the five 
tests had only been invented to cover up 
differences between the two men.
 
 
 
 
Item 9
Channel 4 News, June 10, 2003, 2.08 min.
A day after the Euro announcement, Channel 4 
News’s Gary Gibbon reports from the press 
conference held by the prime minister and 
chancellor, to launch the “Euro roadshow.” The 
aim of the press conference was to build the 
case for joining the Euro in the future, but the 
questions they received were more interested 
in the relationship between the two men. Blair 
was asked directly whether he had a pact with 
Brown to hand over power at some stage. The 
reporter analyses how the two men swapped 
their usual roles, with the prime minister 
arguing the economic case, while the chancellor 
gave the more patriotic case for joining.
Overall
The issue CD contained 9 minutes, 13 
seconds of TV news material, spread 
across four news clips; and 2,545 words of 
newspaper text spread across three articles.
Overall
The strategy CD contained 10 minutes, 
18 seconds of TV news material, spread 
across five news clips; and 2,634 words of 
newspaper text spread across four articles.
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Appendix B
Overview of Independent Variables
Age: Scale ranging from 1 = 16 to 24 to 6 = 65+ (M = 1.67, SD = 1.04)
Gender: 0 = female, 1 = male
Political knowledge: Four-item index, coded to give participants 1 point for each 
correct answer (M = 2.38, SD = 1.05, alpha = .58). Questions tapped factual knowledge 
about British and European politics and international current affairs. Questions were 
(1) “How many members of the EU are there?” (2) “And how many of those countries 
have the Euro as their currency?” (3) “True or false: The number of MPs in British 
Parliament is about 100.” (4) “In which country did last year’s school siege take place?” 
Apart from the true-or-false question, all of the questions asked the respondent to 
choose from five answers, one of them being correct. There was no information in any 
of the stimuli that would help with the knowledge quiz.
Partisanship: On a yes/no scale, participants were asked, “Some people think of 
themselves as usually being a supporter of one political party rather than another. Do 
you usually think of yourself as being a supporter of one particular party or not?” This 
resulted in 104 partisans (coded as 1) and 194 nonpartisans (coded as 0).
Internal political efficacy: On a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly 
agree to 5 = strongly disagree, participants were asked their agreement to the state-
ments, (1) “I think I am better informed about politics than most others”; (2) “It doesn’t 
really matter which party is in power, in the end things go much the same”; and 
(3) “Sometimes politics is so complex that people like me do not understand what is 
going on.” Responses were recoded if appropriate, added, then divided by three to 
form a scale of political efficacy with higher values representing higher efficacy (M = 2.92, 
SD = 0.89, alpha = .77).
Political interest: On a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = none to 5 = a great deal 
(M = 2.72, SD = 0.95).
Voting likelihood: On a 10-point scale ranging from 1 = definitely will not vote to 
10 = definitely will vote with regard to the next general election (M = 7.7, SD = 2.83).
Amount of news consumption: In hours (M = 6.48, SD = 3.34). Based on total hours 
of weekly news consumption.
Interest in EU news: On a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = none to 5 = a great deal 
(M = 3.39, SD = 0.91).
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Notes
1. Although political knowledge is not as comprehensive a measure as political sophistication 
(see Luskin 1987), it still acts as a comparable indicator to previous research on moderators 
of framing effects.
 2. Although the study was not conducted in an election context, intention to vote in the next 
general election is still a relevant indictor of political engagement, as it is a form of participa-
tion and action.
 3. A control group was therefore excluded. Including a control group would essentially mean 
designing a “frameless” news story (de Vreese 2004). Given the aims of this study, it is fair 
to consider the issue group as the functional equivalent of the control group, as they are not 
exposed to the strategy stimulus. This is consistent with the procedures used in similar fram-
ing studies (de Vreese 2004; Iyengar 1991; Nelson et al. 1997; Valentino et al. 2001).
 4. These are “(1) winning and losing as the central concern; (2) the language of wars, games, 
and competition; (3) a story with performers, critics, and audience (voters); (4) centrality of 
performance, style, and perception of the candidate; (5) heavy weighting of polls and the 
candidate’s standing in them” (Cappella and Jamieson 1997: 33).
 5. The quantitative manipulation check included seven questions about the experimental con-
tent, measuring respondents’ agreement on a 5-point Likert-type scale as to whether they 
could recognize elements of strategic reporting. These were recoded and averaged to form 
a scale of strategy frame recognition, ranging from 1 to 5 (with higher numbers indicating 
greater recognition). The means for the strategy group (M = 4.32, SD = 0.47) of sixteen 
respondents were considerably higher than for the issue group (M = 0.77, SD = 0.75) of six-
teen respondents. Given the small numbers, t-test results are inappropriate to report. Qualita-
tive interviews were also conducted with ten respondents as part of the pilot. As Aronson 
et al. (1990) recommend, the qualitative interviews were conducted immediately after the 
participant had seen the media exposure and before the posttest. Interviews revealed the 
expected perceived differences between the news content, with respondents exposed to issue 
stories finding the direction of the reporting to be “straight” and focused on the issues not 
strategies. In contrast, strategy respondents recognized the strategy-centered narrative, with 
“typical politicians” a prominent theme. In the main study, there was an indicator of issue-
specific cynicism that also acted as a de facto manipulation check: “The debate about the 
euro is more about personality than the substance of the issue.” The strategy sample mean 
was 2.41 and the issue sample was 1.83 (t = 5.76, p < .001) on a 5-point scale (with higher 
scores indicating greater cynicism), confirming that the exposures were perceived to be 
different on the dimensions they were chosen on.
 6. Once the participant had completed the experiment, the data was automatically sent to us 
via the web. They did not need to be online when completing the experiment. The CD was 
programmed to retain a “cookie” on the user’s computer until he or she went online.
 7. The mean length of time for the strategy participants (23 minutes, SD = 6.1) was not signifi-
cantly different (p > .05) from that of the issue participants (24 minutes, SD = 7.2).
 8. Hierarchical regression is similar to stepwise regression, but the researcher, not the com-
puter, determines the order of entry of the variables. Variables or sets of variables are 
entered in steps (or blocks), with each independent variable being assessed in terms of what 
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it adds to the prediction of the dependent variable, after the previous variables have been 
controlled for.
 9. The variance inflation factor (VIF) average for political knowledge and the various political 
engagement indicators was 1.031, with none exceeding 1.120.
References
Almond, G., and S. Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ansolabehere, S., and S. Iyengar. 1995. Going Negative: How Attack Ads Shrink and Polarize 
the Electorate. New York, NY: Free Press.
Aronson, E., P. C. Ellsworth, J. M. Carlsmith, and M. Gonzales. 1990. Methods of Research in 
Social Psychology. 2nd Edition. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Bartle, J. 2002. “Why Labour Won—Again.” In Britain at the Polls 2001, ed. A. King. 
New York, NY: Chatham House.
Bennett, W. L. 2004. “Branded Political Communication: Lifestyle Politics, Logo Campaigns, and 
the Rise of Global Citizenship.” In Politics, Products, and Markets: Exploring Political Con-
sumerism Past and Present, ed. M. Micheletti, A. Follesdal, and D. Stolle. New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transaction Books.
Blumler, J. G. 1997. “Origins of the Crisis of Communication for Citizenship.” Political Com-
munication 14:395–404.
Brants, K., C. H. de Vreese, J. Möller, and P. van Praag. 2009. “The Real Spiral of Cynicism? 
Symbiosis and Mistrust between Politicians and Journalists.” International Journal of Press/
Politics 15(1):25–40.
Brown, S. R., and L. E. Melamed. 1990. Experimental Design and Analysis. Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage.
Cappella, J. N., and K. H. Jamieson. 1997. Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Chong, D., and J. N. Druckman. 2007. “Framing Theory.” Annual Review of Political Science 
10:103–26.
Citrin, J. 1974. “The Political Relevance of Trust in Government.” American Political Science 
Review 68:973–88.
Craig, S. C. 1993. The Malevolent Leaders: Popular Discontent in America. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Delli Carpini, M. X. 2000. “Gen.com: Youth, Civic Engagement, and the New Information 
Environment.” Political Communication 17(4):341–49.
de Vreese, C. H. 2004. “The Effects of Strategic News on Political Cynicism, Issue Evaluation, and 
Policy Support: A Two- Wave Experiment.” Mass Communication and Society 7(2):191–214.
de Vreese, C. H. 2005a. Framing Europe: Television News and European Integration. 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Her Spinus.
de Vreese, C. H. 2005b. “The Spiral of Cynicism Reconsidered.” European Journal of 
Communication 20(3):283–301.
de Vreese, C. H., and M. Elenbaas. 2008. “Media in the Game of Politics: Effects of Strate-
gic Metacoverage on Political Cynicism.” Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 
13(3):285–309.
Jackson 99
de Vreese, C. H., J. Peter, and H. A. Semetko. 2001. “Framing Politics at the Launch of the 
Euro: A Cross-National Comparative Study of Frames in the News.” Political Communica-
tion 18:107–22.
de Vreese, C. H., and H. A. Semetko. 2002. “Cynical and Engaged: Strategic Campaign Cov-
erage, Public Opinion and Mobilisation in a Referendum.” Communication Research 
29(6):615–41.
Druckman, J. N. 2004. “Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)
relevance of Framing Effects.” American Political Science Review 98:671–86.
Druckman, J. N., and K. R. Nelson. 2003. “Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens’ Conversa-
tions Limit Elite Influence.” American Journal of Political Science 47:729–45.
Electoral Commission and Hansard Society. 2007. An Audit of Political Engagement 4. London, 
UK: Electoral Commission and Hansard Society.
Elenbaas, M., and de Vreese, C.H. 2008. The Effects of Strategic News on Political Cynicism 
and Vote Choice Among Young Voters in a Referendum. Journal of Communication, 58(3), 
550-67.
Entman, R. M. 1989. Democracy without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Erber, R., and R. R. Lau. 1990. “Political Cynicism Revisited: An Information-Processing Rec-
onciliation of Policy-Based and Incumbency-Based Interpretations of Changes in Trust in 
Government.” American Journal of Political Science Review 34:236–53.
Fallows, J. 1996. Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy. 
New York, NY: Vintage.
Fazio, R. H. 1995. “Attitudes as Object-Evaluation Associations: Determinants, Consequences, 
and Correlates of Attitude Accessibility.” In Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Conse-
quences, ed. R. E. Petty and J. A. Krosnick. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Ford, T. E., and A. W. Kruglanski. 1995. “Effects of Epistemic Motivations on the Use of 
Accessible Constructs in Social Judgment.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
21(9):950–62.
Gavin, N. T. 2007. Press and Television in British Politics. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Iyengar, S. 1991. Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press.
Jamieson, K. H. 1992. Dirty Politics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Just, M., A. Crigler, and T. Buhr. 1999. “Voice, Substance and Cynicism in Presidential 
Campaign Media.” Political Communication 16(1):15–24.
Kerbel, M. R., S. Apee, and M. H. Ross. 2000. “PBS Ain’t So Different: Public Broadcasting, 
Election Frames, and Democratic Empowerment.” Harvard International Journal of Press/
Politics 5(8):8–32.
Kinder, D. R., and T. Palfrey, eds. 1993. Experimental Foundations of Political Science. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Kleinnijenhuis, J., A. M. J. van Hoof, and D. Oegema. 2006. “Negative News and the Sleeper 
Effect of Distrust.” Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 11(2):86–104.
Kuhn, R. 2003. “The Media and Politics.” In Developments in British Politics 7, ed. P. Dunleavy, 
A. Gamble, R. Heffernan, and G. Peele. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
100  International Journal of Press/Politics 16(1)
Lawrence, R. 2000. “Game Framing the Issues: Tracking the Strategy Frame in Public Policy 
News.” Political Communication 17:93–114.
Lewis, J., A. Williams, and B. Franklin. 2008. “Four Rumours and an Explanation.” Journalism 
Practice 2(1):27–45.
Luskin, R.C. 1987. Measuring Political Sophistication. American Journal of Political Science, 
31: 856-99.
McGuire, W. J. 1968. “Personality and Susceptibility to Social Influence.” In Handbook of 
Personality Theory and Research, ed. E. F. Borgatta and W. W. Lambert. New York, NY: 
Rand-McNally.
McLeod, D. M., and B. H. Detenber. 1999. “Framing Effects of Television News Coverage of 
Social Protest.” Journal of Communication 49(3):3–23.
McManus, M. 1994. Market Driven Journalism: Let the Citizen Beware? Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage.
McNair, B. 2006. Cultural Chaos: Journalism, News and Power in a Globalised World. London, 
UK: Routledge.
Miller, A. H. 1974. “Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970.” American Political 
Science Review 68:951–72.
Morris, J., and R. A. Clawson. 2005. “Media Coverage of Congress in the 1990s: Scandals, Person-
alities, and the Prevalence of Policy and Process.” Political Communication 22(3):297–313.
Nelson, T. E., Z. M. Oxley, and R. A. Clawson. 1997. “Toward a Psychology of Framing 
Effects.” Political Behavior 19:221–46.
Norris, P. 2000. A Virtuous Circle: Political Communication in Post-industrial Democracies. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Patterson, T. E. 1993. Out of Order. New York, NY: Knopf.
Pattie, C., P. Seyd, and P. Whiteley. 2004. Citizenship in Britain: Values, Participation and 
Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Petty, R. T., and J. E. Cacioppo. 1986. Communication and Persuasion. New York, NY: 
Springer-Verlag.
Pinkleton, B. E., and E. W. Austin. 2002. “Exploring Relationships among Media Use Fre-
quency, Perceived Media Importance, and Media Satisfaction in Political Disaffection and 
Efficacy.” Mass Communication and Society 5:113–40.
Price, V., and D. Tewksbury. 1997. “News Values and Public Opinion. A Theoretical Account 
of Media Priming and Framing.” In Progress in Communication Science, ed. G. Barnett and 
F. J. Boster. Greenwich, CT: Abiex.
Rhee, J. W. 1997. “Strategy and Issue Frames in Election Campaign Coverage: A Social Cogni-
tive Account of Framing Effects.” Journal of Communication 47(3):26–48.
Rosenstone, S. J., and J. M. Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in 
America. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Sanders, D., and P. Norris. 1998. “Does Negative News Matter? The Effects of Television News 
on Party Images in the 1997 British General Election.” In British Elections and Parties 
Review 8: The 1997 General Election, ed. D. Denver, J. Fisher, P. Cowley, and C. Pattie. 
London, UK: Frank Cass.
Jackson 101
Skorkjaer Binderkrantz, A., and C. Green-Pedersen. 2009. “Policy or Processes in Focus?” 
Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 14:166–85.
Valentino, N. A., M. N. Beckmann, and T. A. Buhr. 2001. “A Spiral of Cynicism for Some: The 
Contingent Effects of Campaign News Frames on Participation and Confidence in Govern-
ment.” Political Communication 18:347–67.
Valenzuela, S. 2009. “Variations in Media Priming: The Moderating Role of Knowledge, 
Interest, News Attention and Discussion.” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 
86(4):756–74.
Weatherford, S. M. 1987. “How Does Government Performance Influence Political Support?” 
Political Behavior 9:5–28.
Zaller, J. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York, NY: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Zaller, J. 2002. “The Statistical Power of Election Studies to Detect Media Exposure Effects in 
Political Campaigns.” Electoral Studies 21:297–330.
Bio
Dan Jackson, PhD, is a senior lecturer in media and communications at Bournemouth 
University.
